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Abstract
Some have argued that the ballot initiative process prevalent in many American states might lower inequality. We contend
this is improbable based on what is known about whether expansion of democracy leads to redistribution, the attitudes of
citizens, and the characteristics of the initiative process. Nevertheless, the proposition needs testing. We examine three
types of evidence. First, we analyze the content and passage of all post-WorldWar II initiatives going to voters in California,
a state that makes heavy use of ballot propositions. Second, we model institutional factors influencing differences in in-
equality at the state-level from 1976–2014 to test the aggregate-level effect of ballot initiatives on income inequality.
Third, we use individual level data to evaluate the claim that frequent initiative use makes lower income people happier
because it helps to reduce inequality. Our analyses consistently indicate that the ballot initiative process fails to reduce
income inequality.
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1. Introduction
Might direct democracy in the American states be
a means for reducing income inequality? Some have
hoped this would be the case. Indeed, people commonly
tell the story that the initiative process was a Progressive
Era created tool allowing the public to bypass state legis-
latures corrupted by large moneyed interests and cater-
ing to the wealthy (see Eule, 1990). Presumably the ini-
tiative was a means of correcting the imbalance, which
logically might include redistributing income (some ad-
vocates also favored measures directly aimed at doing
so such as the progressive income tax). Careful histori-
cal analysis has not been kind to the presumption that
the initiative process, eventually established in 24 of
50 states, was important to fighting corporate power
or advancing a Progressive economic agenda (see espe-
cially Ellis, 2002). Nevertheless, modern day Progressive
organizations such as the Ballot Initiative Strategy Cen-
ter (The Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, n.d.) still ar-
gue that direct democracy can be a key tool in advanc-
ing the interests of the many relative to the wealthy.
Moreover, one recent academic book (Franko & Witko,
2018) argues that in the current era of greater public con-
cern within the American public about growing inequal-
ity, the initiative process encourages adoption of redis-
tributive policies. Additionally, another recent academic
study (Radcliff & Shufeldt, 2016) claims to offer evidence
that greater use of ballot initiatives enhances the subjec-
tivewell-being of lower income citizens. The authors con-
tend this is likely because of redistributive policies under
the initiative process.
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Accordingly, it is worth considering whether use of
state ballot initiatives is associated with income redistri-
bution. We address the topic using three different meth-
ods and a variety of data. First, we examine the sub-
stance and voting results of ballot measures in the en-
tire post-World War II era for California, a state which
especially uses ballot initiatives. We consider how fre-
quently people face redistributive ballot measures, their
explicit aims, and how often they pass. Second, we ex-
amine data on income distribution across the American
states, focusing on whether use of the ballot initiative af-
fects such distribution controlling for a variety of other
factors. Third, we reassess survey data reported to show
that greater use of initiatives leads to more life satisfac-
tion among low income individuals, potentially traceable
to redistributive policy.
For reasons explained in the following section, we
began this study skeptical of the idea that the initiative
process encourages redistribution. We found our skepti-
cism justified. None of the empirical approaches we un-
dertook supported the idea that direct democracy in the
American states promotes redistribution and/orworks to
effectively reduce income inequality.
2. Theory and Expectations
The logic behind an argument that ballot initiatives may
promote redistribution centers on how they might move
policy closer to the median income voter, with the pre-
sumption that representative institutions may be tilted
toward the preferences of higher status, more organized
citizens. Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016) make this explicit:
[S]ince direct democracy is a majoritarian institution,
the outcomes may be relatively more responsive to
the preferences of low SES [socioeconomic status] in-
dividuals than representative institutions. Put differ-
ently, direct democracy might have the strongest im-
pact on those of lower SES precisely because their
voices are so feebly and inconsistently heard in repre-
sentative institutions…such that initiatives may offer
a more level playing field. (2016, pp. 1411–1412)
This argument implies that extending the ability of ordi-
nary citizens to make democratic choices will allow low
andmiddle income voters to unite to promote redistribu-
tion against the interests of a wealthy minority; Shapiro
(2002) refers to this as the “redistributive thesis.”
A more subtle argument suggests that direct democ-
racy promotes redistribution only during periods when
the median voter expresses greater concern about in-
come inequality, such as has occurred in the United
States in recent decades. Franko and Witko (2018) make
this case in their recent study of responses to economic
inequality in the American states: “As government fails
to address inequality, the initiative is being used to craft
policy intended to slow or roll back growing inequal-
ity” (p. 102). Their argument (2018, pp. 141–142, 168)
is explicitly grounded in the presumption that the aca-
demic literature establishes that direct democracy, as a
majoritarian institution, moves policy closer to the de-
sires of the median voter, per research such as that con-
ducted by Matsusaka (2004). Yet this claim is controver-
sial, and more recent studies have cast doubt on the
conclusion that the American ballot initiative process op-
erates in the manner suggested by Matsusaka (Lax &
Phillips, 2009; Monogan, Gray, & Lowery, 2009).
Moreover, based on reconsideration of their own
data, we find reasons to be skeptical about the claims
about redistribution made by Franko and Witko (2018).
Their strongest evidence pertains to enactment of min-
imum wage increases; they provide compelling findings
that initiatives are associated with state increases in the
minimumwage in recent years, controlling for other vari-
ables. Yet they acknowledge that the minimum wage is
a very simple policy and uncommonly easy to explain to
voters. Wewould add that it also does not require voters
to commit government resources or raise tax revenues.
When Franko and Witko examine state adoption of an
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a more complex policy
that does require commitment of government revenues,
they fail to find support for a connection between initia-
tive use and redistribution in their multivariate analysis.
Indeed, we note that of the 15 early adopters of the EITC
which established such a policy between 1986 and 2000
(see Franko & Witko, 2018, p. 158), eleven were non-
initiative states.1 There is also the question of whether
minimumwage increases have lasting effects that would
meaningfully decrease inequality. In 2006, for instance,
six states passed initiatives to increase their minimum
wage. Yet, in the same election, the Democrats took con-
trol of the US Congress and between 2008 and 2010
raised the federal minimum wage from $5.15 an hour
to $7.25.2
There are several broader problems with the line of
argument that the state initiative process encourages re-
distribution. First, there is a lack of general evidence in a
wide variety of contexts for the redistributive thesis. In-
deed, Shapiro writes:
This is one thesis that history has soundly refuted.
Although there have been redistributive eras in cap-
italist democracies since the advent of a universal
franchise, there has been no systematic relationship
1 The non-initiative state early EITC adopters, in order of adoption, included Rhode Island (1986), Maryland (1987), Vermont (1988), Iowa (1989),
Wisconsin (1989), Minnesota (1991), New York (1994), Kansas (1998), Indiana (1999), Illinois (2000), and New Jersey (2000). The initiative state early
adopters included Massachusetts (1997), Oregon (1997), Colorado (1999), and Maine (2000). We count Illinois as a non-initiative state in the present
context since that state’s highly restrictive process only allows initiatives for structural changes in state government.
2 In 2010, the first year of the $7.25 minimum wage implementation, only two of the six states that passed minimum wage increases in 2006 had min-
imum wages greater than the new federal minimum: Ohio at $7.30 an hour and Nevada at $7.55 an hour. Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, and Montana
were all at or below the federal rate upon implementation in 2010.
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between democracy and downward redistribution.
(2002, p. 118)
Second, the idea that self-interest will necessarily push
middle- and low-income initiative voters to unite is the-
oretically suspect, as suggested in the “median voter”
literature applied to direct democracy. On strictly self-
interested economic grounds, middle class voters may
be better off uniting with the wealthy, especially if the
ballot measure is framed in such a way as to provide
middle class voters some net benefits, even if provid-
ing upper class voters a much larger share (see Feld,
Fischer, & Kirchgässner, 2010; Harms & Zink, 2003). This
tendency is exacerbated if, as is commonly the case,
low income voters are known to participate less fre-
quently (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady,1995). The widely
cited Sears and Citrin (1982) study of the battle over the
influential Proposition 13 property tax reduction mea-
sure in California argues for precisely this self-interested
alignment ofmiddle- and upper-class voters. Indeed, one
study suggested that towns in Swedenwith direct democ-
racy spent 40–60% less on public welfare; the authors
hypothesized that this is because direct democracy gov-
ernments are more prone to elite capture (Hinnerich
& Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014). Another suggests that low-
income citizens often bear the brunt of the service de-
creases that result from high-income citizens voting for
tax decreases (Sances, 2018).
Third, as a matter of political psychology it is ques-
tionable whether lower- and middle-class voters nec-
essarily want to redistribute income in the manner
suggested by the redistributive thesis (see especially
Shapiro, 2002). Much literature suggests that a great
many Americans, even those with lower incomes, be-
lieve a market distribution of income is fair and may be
reluctant to try to tamper with that distribution. More-
over, people even at the low end of the income spec-
trum may embrace the “American dream” and believe
that they will someday join the upper ranks. They will
therefore be reluctant to support imposing higher taxes
on the wealthy to support enhanced social programs
that reach the middle class and poor. Similar sentiments
are among the factors that drive widespread opposition
to estate taxes, even though they are paid by relatively
fewwealthy individuals (Graetz& Shapiro, 2011).Middle-
and upper-class citizens may also look down on lower
class citizens for “poor choices,” and be disinclined to
support measures mainly targeted at helping them (e.g.,
Gilens, 1999). Additionally, policymaking elites insulated
from electoral pressure may be more sympathetic to re-
distribution than average voters, suggesting that a move
toward direct democracy could reduce inclination to pur-
sue redistributive policy (Sances, 2016).
Finally, some of the very factors scholars have found
associated with the failure of Congress and other na-
tional institutions to address rising income inequality
also characterize the ballot initiative process in the
United States. In an exhaustive review, Bonica, McCarty,
Poole andRosenthal (2013) identify a number of such fac-
tors, including low voting rates among the poor as well
as sharply rising costs of campaigns that are increasingly
financed by high income voters. Yet these factors are
not just characteristic of candidate races for federal of-
fices; they are also true of state ballot initiative contests.
As far back as 1984, Magleby produced systematic evi-
dence that low income voters were significantly under-
represented in voting on California ballot measures, and
this was even more the case than in voting on candidate
races. Additionally, simply getting an initiative measure
on the ballot requires substantial resources, and usually
the backing of wealthy donors to bankroll signature gath-
ering campaigns, which recently have averaged between
$1 and $10 per signature depending on the state and con-
tinue to rise (Dyck & Lascher, 2019). It is common for
initiative contests to generate more than $1 million in
spending, with most of the monies coming from wealthy
individuals and organizations.
In short, prior literature suggests that we should not
expect state ballot initiatives to reduce income inequal-
ity. Nevertheless, some have argued otherwise, and one
important recent study (Franko &Witko, 2018) contends
that direct democracy is a tool for addressing high and
rising inequality in the contemporary era. Additional sys-
tematic empirical study is therefore needed.
3. Data, Methods, and Results
We seek to test whether ballot initiatives reduce income
inequality in the American states and subject that hypoth-
esis to rigorous empirical testing. We use three distinct
approaches. First, we offer a qualitative of study of which
initiatives do and do not pass. If ballot initiates lower in-
equality, we would expect to find the passage of a signif-
icant number of economically substantial measures that
could be expected to decrease inequality. Second, we an-
alyze aggregate economic outcomes from 1976–2014 in
the American states and consider whether ballot initia-
tive usage appears to reduce inequality. Not only does
this enable us to look beyond a single state, but it allows
us to consider the possible indirect policy effects of the
initiative process that are sometimes claimed. We also
consider the effect of the minimum wage on income in-
equality, and in particular, of minimum wage ballot initia-
tives on income inequality. Finally, we test whether the
frequency of ballot initiatives leads to an increase in life
satisfaction among individuals with the lowest incomes,
thosewith themost to gain from economic redistribution.
3.1. Redistributive Ballot Measures in California
California has been a leader in the use of direct democ-
racy and is second behind Oregon with the number of
total initiatives appearing on the statewide ballot since
their introduction to the state in 1911 (Ballotpedia: The
encyclopedia of American politics, n.d.-a). The “initiative
industry” that coordinates signature gathering and orga-
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nizes campaigns came to prominence in theGolden State.
Academic and non-academic books have been written
about initiative contests in California (e.g., Broder, 2001;
Chávez, 1998; Sears & Citrin, 1982). If we are going to see
if direct democracy has any direct effect on economic re-
distribution, California is a good place to start.
We use two main sources of data. The main one
is the California Ballot Measures Database at UC Hast-
ings Law Library (UC Hastings, CA Ballot Measures). This
online archive includes the full text of individual ballot
propositions and mailed ballot pamphlets. The second
is the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
online Statewide Ballot Measures Database. We use the
Hastings archive to determine the content and intent of
ballot measures and the NCSL archive to determine vot-
ing results. Starting in 2012, NCSL’s Statewide BallotMea-
sures Database only includes preliminary vote totals. To
get the official, final certified voting results, we switched
to Ballotpedia, which gathers their data from the Califor-
nia Secretary of State (Ballotpedia: The encyclopedia of
American politics. (n.d.-b).
California voters considered 8383 propositions from
November 1946 through November 2018, the period we
focus upon for this article.4While almost all of thesemea-
sures appearedon theprimary or general election ballots
in even numbered years, some occurred atmore unusual
times due to special statewide elections. Of the total 838,
we concentrated on 279 that can be classified as origi-
nating with citizens rather than the state legislature, i.e.,
initiative constitutional amendments, initiative statutes,
and popular/veto referendums to overturn acts of the
legislature. The vast majority of such citizen-sponsored
measures were initiative statutes and initiative constitu-
tional amendments.
We developed our own scheme for determining if cit-
izen measures were redistributive and classified them as
either “liberal” (i.e., pro-redistribution) or “conservative”
(i.e., anti-redistributive). We looked at two main criteria:
whether the measure would expand the role and size
of government or the amount of government revenue,
andwhether themeasure generally aimed at strengthen-
ing the power of workers, worker organizations or con-
sumers in direct economic terms vis-à-vis employers. If
a measure increased taxes, increased other sorts of rev-
enue, significantly expanded government programs, ex-
panded employee rights, strengthened labor unions, or
imposed price caps or mandatory price rollbacks on con-
sumers, we labeled it as liberal. If instead it cut taxes,
eliminated or shrank government programs, restricted
governmental revenue, strengthened the hand of em-
ployers, weakened labor unions, or removed price ceil-
ings, we labeled it as conservative.
Our coding scheme implies thatmanymeasures com-
monly labeled by others as “conservative” or “liberal”
would not meet our definitions for purposes of this
project, because they were not primarily economically
redistributive. Thus, wewould not classify an initiative to
legalize marijuana as liberal or a measure to strengthen
criminal penalties as conservative.
We also ignored a number of measures that were
minor or technical in impact. Voters commonly were
asked to decide issues such as whether adding earth-
quake retrofits could avoid property tax reassessment
and consequently a somewhat higher tax bill. Such mea-
sures did not make it on our redistribution list. In con-
trast, we classify as conservative a 1984 initiative statute
that would have drastically cut public welfare payments;
themeasure failed, garnering only 37% of the vote in the
general election.
Table 1 provides a summary of the aggregate results
for citizen-sponsored measures (initiative constitutional
amendments, initiative statutes, initiative bonds, and ref-
erenda) we classified as either conservative or liberal in
economic redistributionist terms from 1946 onward. We
discern several key points. First, less than half of all peti-
tion measures (46%, or 129 out of 279) can be classified
as economically redistributionist. Looking at just liberal
measures, that number falls below 20%. So, compared to
citizen originated measures in general, liberal economic
measures rarely qualify for the ballot. Second, most of
these redistributive measures fail, with voters rejecting
69% of liberal measures and 67% of conservative mea-
sures. Non-economic measures only failed 54% of the
time. Finally, liberal measures collectively did worse with
voters than conservative measures, averaging a smaller
percentage of the vote. Both groups received on average
fewer yes votes than non-redistributive measures.
While there were almost twice as many liberal mea-
sures on the ballot than conservative measures, a strik-
ing feature of most successful liberal measures is their
limited redistributionist scope. Before 1992 there are no
measures establishing or even expanding broad taxes,
making existing taxes more progressive, establishing or
expanding broad social programs, increasing the mini-
mum wage, or strengthening collective bargaining. The
only tax increase passed was on smoking, and that re-
flected more so an emerging social consensus about re-
ducing the harmful health effects of tobacco use than
citizens engaging in redistribution activity (Cummings &
Proctor, 2014).
Moreover, many of the more substantially liberal
measures were defeated and not subsequently enacted,
at the ballot or through the legislature. For example,
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown and other prominent
liberals backed Proposition 11 on the 1980 primary bal-
lot that would have established a 10% oil surtax, us-
ing the campaign slogan, “tax big oil.” The funds would
have been used for increased bus and transportation
3 Six propositions were removed by the courts after they were already placed on the ballot. These are not included.
4 Note that some of the ballot pamphlets in the pre-War era hadminimal information compared tomoremodern pamphlets, making analysis ofmeasures
difficult. For example, the 1920 general election pamphlet contained for each measure a short, legalistic summary followed by the proposed statutory
language without any explanation of implications. These were in turn followed by arguments for and against the measures, sometimes without identi-
fying the affiliation of the person writing the argument.
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Table 1. Results for citizen-sponsored measures, 1946–present.
Conservative Liberal Non-Redistributive
Passed 16 25 71
(33%) (31%) (46%)
Failed 32 56 82
(67%) (69%) (54%)
Total 48 81 153
(100%) (100%) (100%)
Average Yes (unweighted) 46.8% 42.8% 49.1%
services and to develop alternative transportation fuels.
Only 44% of the electorate voted in favor of themeasure.
Voters rejected an oil severance tax again in 2006 by a
similar margin, and California remains the only major oil-
producing state without a statewide severance tax.
It was not until the mid-1990s that substantially lib-
eral measures started doing better at the polls. Califor-
nians passed a small increase in the minimum wage,
expanded after-school programs, and passed several
citizen-initiated bonds. They also lowered the legislative
requirement to pass the annual budget, while also ap-
proving several tax increases. Nevertheless, only a third
of all liberal initiatives have passed since 1992, compared
to a 29% passage rate from 1946 to 1990.
For every successful tax increase or liberal ballotmea-
sure passed since the 1990s,manymore liberalmeasures
failed. Voters killed an increase in the gas tax, the afore-
mentioned oil severance tax, a statewide parcel tax for
schools, higher taxes for universal preschools, cigarette
taxes, and a 1996 initiative that would have increased
taxes on the wealthy. Californians voted against the pub-
lic financing of campaigns in 2000 and 2006, and in 2018
they voted down a measure that would have allowed
strong rent control at the local level. California might
have become a more liberal state, but its voters are still
quite cautious when it comes to liberal economic bal-
lot measures.
By contrast, conservative measures passed by voters
have sustained far greater impact. The clearest example
is Proposition 13, passed in 1978, which drastically low-
ered property taxes, restricted the ability of represen-
tative institutions to raise other types of taxes, restruc-
tured the relationship between state and local govern-
ments, and launched the populist tax revolt movement
worldwide. Other major conservative measures enacted
include: a 1950 initiative requiring approval of the local
electorate before any public funded low-income hous-
ing project can be built; a cap on total state government
spending passed in 1979; and two similar measures in
1986 and 1996 requiring voter approval for any tax in-
crease at the local level.
In short, it is difficult to look at the overall results
from 1946 through 2018 and fail to conclude that conser-
vatives collectively scored more successes than liberals
on redistribution issues decided at the ballot box. Con-
servative measures not only succeed slightly more of-
ten, but the successful scope of conservative initiatives
seems far greater as well. Even in contemporary liberal
California, during the period in which Franko and Witko
(2018) claim states have been responding to perceived
increased economic inequality, conservatives still find
some avenues to restrict redistribution, and most liberal
measures still fail.
3.2. Aggregate Analysis of Income Inequality in
the States
Based on analysis of the substance and success of
California ballot measures, there is little reason to think
the ballot initiative process in the Golden State directly
reduced income inequality. Nevertheless, it is possible
that California is an outlier in this respect and/or that the
impact of the ballot initiative is mostly indirect. That is,
perhaps the threat of a ballot initiative encourages law-
makers to pass redistributive legislation aimed at reduc-
ing inequality to head off more extreme versions that
might be approved by votes. In other contexts, some
scholars have argued that the threat of the initiative
constrains legislative behavior in such a manner (e.g.,
Gerber, 1996), albeit without systematic empirical evi-
dence of how frequently this occurs (see Dyck & Lascher,
2019). We are skeptical that the threat of the initiative
would necessarily push lawmakers toward enacting re-
distributive legislation favoring the lesswell-off (e.g., pas-
sage of an income tax surcharge to fund programs tar-
geted at low income voters) rather than the opposite
(e.g., passage of property tax relief tilted toward high in-
come citizens). Yet more empirical evidence is needed.
Fortunately, we can build on a recent study to test
the claim that cross-state differences in use of the initia-
tive process are associated with differences in income in-
equality. Bucci (2018a) developed a data set allowing her
to compare income inequality across all 50 states for the
period 1976 to 2014, giving her a 39 year cross-sectional
time-series dataset. This allowed for a contrast of the
commonly used Gini index of household income for each
state in each year. Her primary purposewas to assess the
impact of labor unionization on income inequality across
states, controlling for a wide variety of other variables.
She did not consider direct democracy mechanisms; we
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added such information to the data set. If the ballot ini-
tiative process indeed helped to reduce income inequal-
ity, we would expect to see that the Gini index would be
lower in states making greater use of the initiative pro-
cess (controlling for other variables).
Here, we model both market inequality and post-
transfer inequality as a function of the ballot initiative
process. We follow the modeling approach suggested
by Kelly and Witko (2012), who use an error correction
model. Put in simple terms, we operationalize the depen-
dent variable at time period t as the change from t − 1
to t. Each independent variable then includes a change
variable and a lag variable when appropriate; if either of
these is significant, we can say that the variable exerts a
significant effect on income inequality.
The model includes controls for union density5, pol-
icy liberalism, gross state product, the percentage of the
state economy that is based in manufacturing, the per-
centage of the population that is nonwhite, and the un-
employment rate.6
We also introduce two simple measures of the initia-
tive process. One is the dummy variable of whether or
not the state has the ballot initiative. This should give us
the average effect comparing initiative to non-initiative
states and has been frequently used in aggregate studies
of the initiative (e.g., Boehmke, 2005; Matsusaka, 2004).
Additionally, we include a measure for initiative density,
using the average number of initiatives on the ballot in
the state from 1900 to the present year, lagged one year.
This captures the large state level variance in initiative
use. Finally, we introduce two ways to capture the effect
of the minimum wage on income inequality. First, we
include a variable that measures the value of the state
minimum wage in excess of the federal minimum wage.
This measure is used to capture the independent effect
of state minimum wage laws insofar as they exceed the
minimumwage standards set by the federal government.
This is included as a control in all the models that use a
general measure of the ballot initiative to predict income
inequality. Second, we explicitly model in Table 2 the ef-
fect of state minimum wage ballot initiatives passage on
income inequality.7 The models are all estimated using
generalized least squares with random effects and clus-
tered state standard errors.
The results conform mostly to expectations. Market
inequality, as measured by the Gini index, is lower in
states with higher union density, less policy liberalism, a
minimum wage that is higher than the federal standard,
and those that experience lower levels of unemploy-
ment. Post-transfer inequality, alsomeasured by the Gini
index, is lower in states with higher union density, lower
unemployment, a lower gross state product, and when
there is a smaller non-white population. Notably, in all
four models in Table 2, for both income inequality in the
labor market (market inequality) and income inequality
that is calculated after accounting for redistributive gov-
ernment programs (post-transfer inequality), both mea-
sures of the ballot initiative (a simple dummy (0,1) for the
existence of the initiative and ameasure of initiative den-
sity) have no effect on either form of income inequality.
Also, of particular interest is that minimumwage policies
appear to reduce income inequality in the labor market,
as we might expect, but when we account for income in-
equality after redistribution has taken place, there is no
effect for minimum wage policies on income inequality
(Models 2–3 and 2–4).
In Table 3, we take the test of the effect of mini-
mum wage policies on income inequality further, consid-
ering the effect of minimum wage ballot initiatives on
both market inequality and post-transfer inequality. Be-
tween 1976 and 2014, 11 states raised their minimum
wages via ballot initiatives, with the majority of these in-
creases coming in 2006.8 Using this measure in lieu of
both the minimum wage measure and the ballot initia-
tive measure in Table 3 produces null effects in predict-
ing both market inequality and post-transfer inequality.
Therefore, while the literature may have firmly estab-
lished a connection between ballot initiatives and min-
imum wage policies (Franko & Witko, 2018), the em-
pirical connection between the minimum wage and in-
come inequality remains tenuous. As we would expect,
minimum wage increases in states that are above the
federal minimum reduce inequality in the labor market.
However, the effects of the reductions are subsumed by
the social safety net when we measure inequality after
accounting for government redistribution. Furthermore,
we cannot attribute this reduction to policies passed via
the ballot initiative. And this is the case even though
there is reason to think that minimum wages are easier
to enact by the initiative process than other redistribu-
tive measures, as we indicated previously.
Overall, we see no evidence in either model that the
presence or usage of direct democracy has any impact
on income inequality. Consistent with our observation
that redistribution in California is a rare ballot initiative
event, we now seewith a comprehensive quantitative ag-
gregate analysis of all 50 states over nearly a 40-year pe-
riod that direct democracy is not associated with lower
levels of state level income inequality. This analysis ac-
counts for both direct and indirect effects, and also con-
siders the special case of whether the ballot initiative has
reduced income inequality via the minimum wage.
5 This was the main focus of Bucci’s (2018a) study and despite the addition of additional variables and a different modeling approach, we found this
variable very robust to additional variables and model choice.
6 The data here come from Bucci (2018b). Exceptions to this are: unemployment data are from Klarner (2015); Minimum wage data are from the United
States Department of Labor (n.d.); and ballot initiative data are from the authors’ personal database.
7 A state-year is coded 1 if a state passed a minimum wage initiative in the previous year and then is coded 1 for every subsequent year. All other
state-years are coded as 0.
8 The states are Arizona (2006), California (1996), Colorado (2006), Florida (2004), Missouri (2006), Montana (2006), Nevada (2004 & 2006), Ohio (2006),
Oregon (1996 & 2002), South Dakota (2014), and Washington (1988 & 1998). Data collected from the NCSL (n.d.).
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Table 2. Initiatives and income inequality, 1976–2014.
ΔMarket Gini Coefficient Δ Post-Transfer Gini Coefficient
Model 2–1 Model 2–2 Model 2–3 Model 2–4
Variables 𝛽 SE B SE 𝛽 SE 𝛽 SE
Market Gini (t−1) −0.1643 0.0193*** −0.1645 0.0198*** — — — —
Post-transfer Gini (t−1) — — — — −0.2195 0.0218*** −0.2190 0.0214***
Δ Union Density −0.0534 0.0331 −0.0533 0.0329 −0.0592 0.0264* −0.0598 0.0263*
Union Density (t−1) −0.0474 0.0130*** −0.0478 0.0123*** −0.0506 0.0129*** −0.0520 0.0125***
Δ Policy Liberalism −0.0107 0.0227 −0.0093 0.0226 −0.0033 0.0212 −0.0025 0.0211
Policy Liberalism (t−1) 0.0091 0.0044* 0.0096 0.0041* 0.0072 0.0045 0.0081 0.0041*
Δ Gross State Product −0.0249 0.0214 −0.0272 0.0217 0.0019 0.0184 0.0027 0.0190
Gross State 0.0054 0.0028 0.0056 0.0027* 0.0093 0.0036** 0.0094 0.0033**
Product (t−1)
Δ %Manufacturing 0.0273 0.0326 0.0287 0.0328 0.0024 0.0294 0.0038 0.0294
% Manufacturing (t−1) 0.0029 0.0072 0.0036 0.0065 −0.0072 0.0061 −0.0057 0.0057
Δ % Pop Nonwhite 0.0237 0.0307 0.0241 0.0306 0.0257 0.0253 0.0271 0.0250
% Pop Nonwhite (t−1) 0.0056 0.0041 0.0060 0.0037 0.0099 0.0044* 0.0104 0.0042*
Δ State Min. Wage −0.0038 0.0021 −0.0037 0.0021 0.0021 0.0017 0.0021 0.0017
Above Fed.
State Min. Wage −0.0029 0.0009** −0.0029 0.0010** 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 0.0009
Above Fed. (t−1)
Δ % Unemployment 0.0950 0.0371* 0.0950 0.0375* 0.0570 0.0314 0.0578 0.0317
Unemployment (t−1) 0.1484 0.0218*** 0.1477 0.0220*** 0.0736 0.0192*** 0.0737 0.0196***
Initiative (0,1) (t−1) −0.0004 0.0012 — — −0.0008 0.0012 — —
Δ Initiative Density — — −0.0272 0.0191 — — −0.0026 0.0192
Initiative Density (t−1) — — 0.0001 0.0006 — — −0.0005 0.0006
Constant 0.0770 0.0099*** 0.0768 0.0103*** 0.0949 0.0098*** 0.0942 0.0097***
R2 (within) .164 .163 .177 .176
R2 (between) .030 .030 .003 .002
R2 (overall) .110 .110 .111 .111
N 1900 1900 1900 1900
Notes:models areGLS error correctionmodels calculatedwith randomeffects; standard errors have been clustered by state. ***p< .001,
**p < .01, *p < .05.
3.3. Direct Democracy, Redistribution, and Life
Satisfaction
Our final empirical investigation focuses on the individ-
ual level. Recently, Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016) advanced
the argument that ballot initiatives might increase the
subjective well-being of low-income individuals. They ar-
gue that this is because both the intrinsic and instrumen-
tal effects of ballot initiatives on citizenswill especially be
felt by low-income citizens. By intrinsic benefits, they re-
fer to the oft-cited secondary effects of direct democracy
(c.f. Smith & Tolbert, 2004), whereby citizens are thought
to acquire the positive normative attributes of more en-
gaged democratic citizens. By instrumental benefits, they
refer to the policies passed at the ballot box. Radcliff and
Shufeldt (2016, pp. 1417–1418) connect the idea directly
to redistribution and ballot initiatives in concluding:
While direct democracy involves little costs to any-
one, it provides the bulk of its rewards to low- and
middle- income individuals. Direct democracy, at least
in the context of the American States, may then
work in a logic consistent with the simple majoritar-
ian interpretation of democracy…creating as it does
an environment in which persons of modest means
win politically.
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Table 3.Minimum wage initiatives and income inequality, 1976–2014.
ΔMarket Gini Coefficient Δ Post-Transfer Gini Coefficient
Model 3–1 Model 3–2
Variables B SE 𝛽 SE
Market Gini (t−1) −0.1684 0.0201*** — —
Post-transfer Gini (t−1) — — −0.2163 0.0217***
Δ Union Density −0.0556 0.0332 −0.0605 0.0265*
Union Density (t−1) −0.0455 0.0130*** −0.0511 0.0127***
Δ Policy Liberalism −0.0124 0.0226 −0.0013 0.0211
Policy Liberalism (t−1) 0.0061 0.0037 0.0081 0.0042
Δ Gross State Product −0.0284 0.0202 0.0062 0.0169
Gross State Product (t−1) 0.0054 0.0030 0.0087 0.0036*
Δ %Manufacturing 0.0180 0.0322 0.0064 0.0295
% Manufacturing (t−1) 0.0057 0.0070 −0.0051 0.0053
Δ % Pop Nonwhite 0.0221 0.0316 0.0275 0.0252
% Pop Nonwhite (t−1) 0.0059 0.0037 0.0108 0.0041**
Δ % Unemployment 0.0802 0.0356 0.0522 0.0301
Unemployment (t−1) 0.1481 0.0233*** 0.0677 0.0193***
Min. Wage Initiative (0,1) (t−1) −0.0008 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015
Constant 0.0775 0.0106*** 0.0931 0.0098***
R2 (within) .165 .177
R2 (between) .033 .002
R2 (overall) .106 .110
N 1900 1900
Notes:models areGLS error correctionmodels calculatedwith randomeffects; standard errors have been clustered by state. ***p< .001,
**p < .01, *p < .05.
Thus far, the results of our aggregate analysis indicate
that there is little reason to suspect that there would be
any empirical support for the instrumental benefits ar-
gument. Furthermore, recent studies have largely under-
mined the evidence for the positive secondary effects of
the state ballot initiative process and even supported a
negative relationship between initiative use and trust in
government (for a summary of recent studies andpresen-
tation of additional evidence see Dyck & Lascher, 2019).
We therefore find no reason to hypothesize that more
ballot initiatives lead to greater life satisfaction, and no
reason to suspect that this effect is stronger among those
at lower income levels. Yet we note that one widely cited
study indicated that direct democracy led to greater life
satisfaction in Switzerland (Frey & Stutzer, 2000), though
this finding has been challenged on empirical grounds
(Dorn, Fischer, Kirchgässner, & Sousa-Poza, 2008).
Nevertheless, we reexamine the data from the DDB
Life Style Survey popularized by Putnam (2000) and used
in Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016). This dataset includes over
45,000 cases from Americans in the 48 lower contiguous
states surveyed from 1985 through 1998. We leave most
of the details of our replication and extension of their
results to a supplementary appendix. However, here we
offer two broad points. First, we think that the models
presented by Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016) can be signifi-
cantly improved. Second, their results did not appropri-
ately consider the substantivemeaning of the interaction
effects, which we demonstrate to be of negligible signif-
icance. We begin on this latter point by recovering the
predicted values from Radcliff and Shufeldt’s (2016) Ta-
ble 1a, which we were able to replicate given the gen-
erosity of the authors in sharing their data and coding.
In Figures 1 and 2, we present the predicted values
from this model at the minimum and maximum values
of income. In Figure 1, we see that those at higher in-
comes enjoy a higher life satisfaction when living in non-
initiative states, but as initiative usage increases, this gap
appears to close. Yet this is .07 difference on a 6-point
scale (4.00 to 4.07), or a maximum difference of 1%. In
Figure 2, we see the full value of the life satisfactionmea-
sure plotted on the Y axis as a 6-point Likert scale. It is
apparent that (1) there is no discernible substantive re-
lationship between ballot initiative usage and life satis-
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Figure 2. Figure 1, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
faction for those at high incomes or low incomes, and
(2) this relationship is in no meaningful way mediated by
income. In other words, these lines depict the same neg-
ligible effect. The dataset is large (45,000 cases) and so
we are seeing statistically significant results on this inter-
action which are not substantively interesting.
Furthermore, as we detail in the supplementary ap-
pendix, there are two problems with the Radcliff and
Shufeldt (2016) initiative measures. First, we uncovered
a significant data coding error for the initiative measure
in our replication. Second, the structure of the measure
builds in an unnecessary time dimension by pivoting the
measure of usage at 1960 and adding it up to the sur-
vey year (instead of using an average). As ballot initia-
tive usage increases over time, this means this measure
will always increase for initiative states and will build a
time trend within states across years into the dataset.
When we correct these and other problems, the statis-
tically (but not substantively) significant interaction ef-
fect that Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016) reported between
initiatives and income dissipates. In Table 4, we demon-
strate what happens to the main models when the initia-
tive variable is corrected. The interaction effect produces
a null effect.
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Table 4. Initiatives, income and life satisfaction, DDB life style survey, 1985–1998.
Table 1, Model a Replication with Replication with Table 1, Model b Replication with Replication with
Random State initiative variable initiative variable State Clustered Std. initiative variable initiative variable
Effects (a) corrected (b) average (c) Errors with year & corrected (e) average (f)
region dummies (d)
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Total Initiatives .109 .005** 0.104 0.043** .060 .029** 0.001 0.043
Avg Initiatives — — — — 0.030 0.014** — — — — −0.001 0.013
Individual Income .005 .002*** 0.005 0.002** 0.005 0.002** .005 .002*** 0.005 0.002*** 0.005 0.002***
Ins X Income −.010 .005** −0.006 0.005 −0.002 0.002 −.010 .000*** −0.005 0.003+ −0.002 0.001
State Level Vars
State Population −.000 .000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** −.000 .000** 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000+
State Income (PC) .000 .000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** .000 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Racial Diversity .154 .076** 0.155 0.076** 0.160 0.076** .178 .115** 0.172 0.117 0.171 0.118
Social Capital .016 .015 0.008 0.016 0.010 0.016 .030 .024 0.029 0.024 0.029 0.024
Ind’l Level Vars
Financial Satisfaction .394 .004*** 0.394 0.004*** 0.394 0.004*** .394 .005*** 0.394 0.005*** 0.394 0.005***
Education −.019 .005*** −0.019 0.005*** −0.019 0.005*** −.019 .005*** −0.019 0.005*** −0.019 0.005***
Unemployed (0,1) −.313 .035*** −0.314 0.035*** −0.314 0.035*** −.311 .043*** −0.311 0.043*** −0.311 0.043***
Sex .088 .012*** 0.087 0.012*** 0.087 0.012*** .088 .013*** 0.088 0.013*** 0.087 0.013***
Children −.109 .013*** −0.108 0.013*** −0.108 0.013*** −.109 .015*** −0.109 0.015*** −0.109 0.015***
Black −.200 .025*** −0.200 0.025*** −0.200 0.025*** −.198 .031*** −0.198 0.031*** −0.198 0.031***
Race-Other .002 .028 −0.001 0.028 0.000 0.028 .003 .016 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.016
Age −.042 .002*** −0.042 0.002*** −0.042 0.002*** −.042 .003*** −0.042 0.003*** −0.042 0.003***
Age2 .000 .000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** .000 .000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
Widowed .217 .031*** 0.217 0.031*** 0.217 0.031*** .215 .038*** 0.215 0.038*** 0.215 0.038***
Divorced .051 .027*** 0.050 0.027+ 0.050 0.027+ .047 .040 0.047 0.040 0.047 0.040
Married .293 .021*** 0.293 0.021*** 0.292 0.021*** .291 .029*** 0.291 0.029*** 0.291 0.029***
Church Attendance .030 .002*** 0.030 0.002*** 0.030 0.002*** .030 .003*** 0.030 0.003*** 0.030 0.003***
Social Trust .106 .005*** 0.106 0.005*** 0.106 0.005*** .105 .004*** 0.105 0.004*** 0.105 0.004***
Health of R .148 .004*** 0.148 0.004*** 0.148 0.004*** .148 .005*** 0.148 0.005*** 0.148 0.005***
Year −.001 .002*** −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.002 — — — — — —
Constant 3.420 3.209 4.148 3.228 3.376 3.188 2.250 .115 2.151 0.117*** 2.151 0.117***
N 47636 47636 47636 47636 47636 47636
Adjusted R2 .2990 .2987 .2987 .2995 .2988 .2988
Notes: Columns (a) and (d) are the coefficients, standard errors and significance tests reported by Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016). Models a/b/c are estimated as a linear regression model with random state
effects; columns d/e/f are estimated as a linear regression model with fixed effects (not shown) for year and census region and clustered standard errors at the state level. +p < .10; **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 380–409 389
4. Conclusion
Rising economic inequality within the United States and
other advanced economies has generated much schol-
arly attention over the past two decades. For example,
the American Political Science Association released a re-
port (2010) from top scholars warning of serious conse-
quences for American democracy from sharply rising in-
equality. Scholars also commonly acknowledge that pub-
lic policy choices significantly influence the level of eco-
nomic inequality, and often for the worse (see for exam-
ple Bonica et al., 2013). Faced with concerns of this kind,
scholars, advocates, and concerned citizens alike have
considered possible political reforms ormechanisms that
might reduce inequality.
Given that direct democracy still enjoys high levels
of popularity in many quarters, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that some look to mechanisms such as the ballot ini-
tiative process as a partial solution to growing inequal-
ity. Yet based on a range of evidence, we see no rea-
son to think that income inequality in the United States
would be reduced if more states established an initiative
process or states that had it made greater use of ballot
measures. And for readers fromother countries, our find-
ings suggest caution in believing that adding American
style direct democracywould help address their owneco-
nomic inequality issues.
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Appendix
In this supplementary appendix, we explain in more detail our replication and extension of the Radcliff and Shufeld (2016,
hereafter R&S) analysis of theDDB Life Style Survey. The survey contains yearly data from1975 to 1998, including a question
on life satisfaction, the focus of this study, from 1985 to 1998. In preparing this study, we contacted the authors and they
generously shared their level-2 data file with us. This and the details from the original article led us to be able to replicate
six of the seven statistical models presented in R&S.
In completing the replication, we noted both a technical coding error and also a conceptual error in the measurement
of “density of ballot initiatives,” which is measured as a cumulative number of initiatives from 1960 up to the year of the
survey. It appears the authors have only assigned non-zero values to this variable in years where a state actually added
values to the total. This means that for most states in odd years, states with long cumulative histories of initiative usage
like California, Oregon, and Coloradowere coded as zero.We illustrate the coding error in Figure A1. Rather than observing
a steadily increasing relationship where each new initiative increases the total # of initiatives measurement (a measure
of historical initiative usage/density), the patterns are zig-zags. The exception is Washington State, which regularly has
odd-year statewide initiative elections. In two of the seven models that R&S present, they measure the initiative process
using a simple dummy variable. We discovered a nearly identical error in this measure. In years that state did not have
any initiatives, the variable is coded as zero instead of 1. When corrected, 45.7% of the respondents in the DDB Life Style
survey from 1985–1998 live in initiative states, but according to this coding, fewer than 20% of the respondents are coded
as living in initiatives states; almost none are coded as living in initiative states during odd years. We detail the error of this



















Figure A1. Visual depiction of coding problems of initiative variable in R&S. Note: Figure depicts the coding error in the
key explanatory variable “Total # of Initiatives from 1960 to the current survey year.” States that did not have initiatives
in the survey year were coded as zero instead of having their previous year codes added forward. For states without odd
year initiatives, this effectively made their codes zero in almost all odd years of the data.
Our first task is to correct both of these measures and to re-estimate the models. However, once corrected, the initiative
densitymeasure still suffers from a conceptual problem. Because it is anchoredwith the year 1960, themeasurewill always
increase and never decrease, which builds an upward sloping time trend into the explanatory variable of interest. As R&S
suggest by explicitly modeling time in their models, time is an important construct in the measurement of life satisfaction.
Therefore, this introduction of a trend may be unintentionally biasing the results. There is an easy fix for this. To preserve
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the measure of density, we can simply use the average number of initiatives from 1960 to the survey year; this allows
the measure to vary and to either increase or decrease based on how frequently initiatives are used in ensuing years. We
therefore first proceed by re-estimating the models from Table 1 in R&S in the main text of the article as Table 4 and from
Tables 2 and 3 from R&S in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. For the five models that use initiative density as an explanatory
variable, we present a variant of the model with the corrected measure, and also with an alternate measure of density
using the average number of initiatives from 1960 to the survey year. For the initiative dummy models, we present the
replication followed by the corrected model. We also present visual depictions of the interaction effects for the seven






















Figure A2. Visual depiction of coding problems of Initiative Dummy Variable in R&S. Note: Figure depicts the coding error
in the key explanatory variable “Yes/No has initiative.” States that did not have initiatives in the survey year were coded
as zero instead of 1. For states without odd year initiatives, this effectively made their codes zero in almost all odd years
of the data.
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Table A1. Initiatives, income and life satisfaction (replication of Radcliff & Shufeldt, 2016, Table 2).
R&S Replication Replication R&S Replication Replication R&S Replication
Table 2 with initiative with initiative Table 2, Model b with initiative with initiative Table 2, Model c with initiative
Model a variable average (c) Without CA variable average (f) Initiative (0,1) dummy variable
(a) corrected (b) & OR (d) corrected (e) model (g) corrected (h)
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Initiative Density .110 .030*** .111 .043*** .032 .014** .209 .101** .119 .091 .018 .028 — — — —
Initiative (0,1) — — — — — — — — — — — — .061 .029*** .044 .023+
Individual Income .020 .008*** .020 .008** .020 .008** .020 .008*** .019 .008** .019 .008** .020 .008*** .020 .008**
Initiative X Income −.010 .005** −.006 .005 −.002 .002 −.018 .012+ −.004 .011 .001 .004 −.007 .004** −.002 .003
State Level Vars
State Population −.000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** −.000 .000*** .000 .000** .000 .000** −.000 .000** .000 .000**
State Income (PC) .000 .000+ .000 .000+ .000 .000+ .000 .000+ .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000+ .000 .000+
Racial Diversity .194 .088** .213 .089** .214 .089** .208 .091** .204 .091** .213 .091** .208 .088** .184 .088**
Social Capital .022 .017+ .016 .017 .018 .017 .019 .017+ .015 .018 .019 .018 .022 .017+ .016 .017
Ind’l Level Vars
Financial Satisfaction .394 .004*** .394 .004*** .394 .004*** .390 .004*** .390 .004*** .390 .004*** .394 .004*** .394 .004***
Education −.019 .005*** −.019 .005*** −.019 .005*** −.019 .006*** −.019 .006*** −.019 .006*** −.019 .005*** −.019 .005***
Unemployed (0,1) −.314 .035*** −.314 .035*** −.314 .035*** −.293 .038*** −.293 .038*** −.293 .038*** −.313 .035*** −.313 .035***
Sex .088 .012*** .087 .012*** .087 .012*** .085 .013*** .085 .013*** .085 .013*** .088 .012*** .087 .012***
Children −.109 .013*** −.109 .013*** −.109 .013*** −.116 .014*** −.116 .014*** −.116 .014*** −.109 .013*** −.108 .013***
Black −.200 .025*** −.200 .025*** −.200 .025*** −.183 .026*** −.182 .026*** −.183 .026*** −.200 .031*** −.199 .025***
Race-Other .001 .028 −.002 .028 −.001 .028 .002 .033 −.002 .033 −.001 .033 .003 .028 .003 .028
Age −.042 .002*** −.042 .002*** −.042 .002*** −.042 .003*** −.042 .003*** −.042 .003*** −.042 .002*** −.042 .002***
Age2 .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000***
Widowed .218 .031*** .218 .031*** .218 .031*** .224 .034*** .224 .034*** .224 .034*** .218 .031*** .217 .031***
Divorced .052 .027** .052 .027+ .052 .027+ .030 .029 .029 .029 .030 .029 .052 .027** .051 .027+
Married .294 .021*** .294 .021*** .294 .021*** .291 .023*** .291 .023*** .291 .023*** .294 .021*** .294 .021***
Church Attendance .030 .002*** .030 .002*** .030 .002*** .032 .003*** .032 .003*** .032 .003*** .030 .002*** .030 .002***
Social Trust .106 .005*** .106 .005*** .106 .005*** .106 .005*** .106 .005*** .106 .005*** .106 .005*** .106 .005***
Health of R .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004***
Transfer Payments .070 .036** .081 .036** .079 .036 .080 .038** .079 .038** .079 .038** .066 .036** .067 .036+
Transfer $ X Income −.008 .004** −.008 .004** −.008 .004** −.008 .004** −.008 .004+ −.008 .004+ −.008 .004** −.008 .004**
Year −.001 .002 −.002 .002** −.002 .002** −.001 .002 −.001 .002 −.001 .002 −.001 .002 −.001 .002
Constant 3.420 3.209 6.679 3.770 5.637 3.694 3.420 3.209 4.847 3.947 4.154 3.929 4.405 3.643 4.271 3.627
N 47636 47636 47636 42053 42053 42053 47636 47636
Adjusted R2 .2991 .2988 .2987 .2960 .2956 .2955 .2997 .2987
Notes: +p < .10; **p < .05, ***p < .01. All models in this table are estimated using linear regression with random state effects. Columns a, d, and g are the coefficients, standard errors and significance
tests reported by Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016). Models b, c, e, f, and h are estimated as linear regression models with random state effects.
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Table A2. Initiatives, income and life satisfaction (replication of Radcliff & Shufeldt 2016, Table 3).
R&S Replication with initiative Replication with R&S Replication with initiative
Table 3, Model 1 (a) variable correction (b) initiative average (c) Table 2, Model 2 (d) dummy variable corrected (e)
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Initiative Density .100 .050** .097 .045** .027 .015+ — — — —
Initiative (0,1) — — — — — — .057 .028*** 0.041 0.023+
Individual Income .005 .002*** .005 .002** .005 .002** .005 .002** 0.005 0.002**
Initiative X Income −.010 .005** −.006 .005 −.002 .002 −.007 .003** −0.002 0.003
State Level Vars
State Population −.000 .000 .000 .000** .000 .000** −.000 .000 0.000 0.000**
State Income (PC) .000 .000 .000 .000* .000 .000+ .000 .000 0.000 0.000+
Racial Diversity .129 .096 .144 .083** .147 .084+ .130 .100 0.144 0.082+
Social Capital .011 .018 .008 .017 .010 .017 .011 .019 0.011 0.017
Ind’l Level Vars
Financial Satisfaction .394 .004*** .394 .004*** .394 .004*** .394 .004*** 0.394 0.004***
Education −.019 .005*** −.019 .005*** −.019 .005*** −.018 .005*** −0.019 0.005***
Unemployed (0,1) −.310 .035*** −.312 .035*** −.312 .035*** −.311 .035*** −0.312 0.035***
Sex .087 .012*** .087 .012*** .087 .012*** .088 .011*** 0.087 0.012***
Children −.109 .013*** −.109 .013*** −.109 .013*** −.109 .013*** −0.109 0.013***
Black −.197 .025*** −.197 .025*** −.197 .025*** −.196 .024*** −0.197 0.025***
Race-Other .004 .028 .002 .028 .003 .028 .004 .028 0.005 0.028
Age −.042 .002*** −.042 .002*** −.042 .002*** −.042 .002*** −0.042 0.002***
Age2 .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** .000 .000*** 0.000 0.000***
Widowed .215 .031*** .216 .031*** .215 .031*** .215 .031*** 0.215 0.031***
Divorced .048 .027** .048 .027+ .048 .027+ .047 .026+ 0.048 0.027+
Married .293 .021*** .292 .021*** .291 .021*** .291 .029*** 0.291 0.021***
Church Attendance .030 .002*** .030 .002*** .030 .002*** .030 .002*** 0.030 0.002***
Social Trust .105 .005*** .106 .005*** .105 .005*** .105 .005*** 0.105 0.005***
Health of R .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** .148 .004*** 0.148 0.004***
Constant Not reported 2.131 .084*** 2.133 .085*** Not reported 2.124 0.085***
Residual variance 1.22 1.511 1.511 1.22 1.511
Intercept variance for state .028 >.001 >.001 .028 >.001
Intercept variance for state-years .016 >.001 >.001 .104 >.001
Log restricted-likelihood −77594.2 −77432.1 −77432.6 −77586.1 −77432.4
Wald Test 20296.80*** 20328.46*** 20324.84*** 20296.19*** 20329.32***
N (stats) 48 48 48 48 48
N (state years) 672 672 672 672 672
N (individuals) 47636 47636 47636 47636 47636
Notes: +p < .10; **p < .05, ***p < .01; Columns a and d are the coefficients, standard errors and significance tests reported by Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016). Models b, c, and e are estimated using a 3-level
multilevel mixed linear model: individuals (level 1) in state-years (level 2) in states (level 3). Year dummies are included in all models, but not presented.
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In all seven models where the measure of initiative is simply corrected, the sign on the interaction term, measuring the
difference in the slope of the effect of the initiative on life satisfaction moves from statistically significant to not statisti-
cally significant. Therefore, it appears the findings presented in R&S are a function of a data coding error with regards to
measurement of initiative context, both as a dummy variable and as density from 1960 to the year of the survey. None of
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Figure A3b. Figure A3a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A4b. Figure A4a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A5b. Figure A5a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A6b. Figure A6a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A7b. Figure A7a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A8b. Figure A8a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A9b. Figure A9a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A10a. Interaction of initiative and income, from Table A1 (f).
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Figure A10b. Figure A10a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.




































under $10,000 $100,000 or more
Figure A11a. Interaction of initiative and income, from Table A1 (h).
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Figure A11b. Figure A11a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A12a. Interaction of initiative and income, from Table A2 (b).
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Figure A12b. Figure A12a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A13a. Interaction of initiative and income, from Table A2 (c).
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Figure A13b. Figure A13a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
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Figure A14a. Interaction of initiative and income, from Table A2 (e).
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Figure A14b. Figure A14a, with the Y-axis rescaled to represent the full range of plausible values.
The figures also tell a relatively consistent story. Under some specifications, we observe a positive relationship between
the ballot initiative and life satisfaction among those with the lowest incomes, but the substantive nature of this effect is
small, the slope of this effect is never statistically different than the effect for other income categories, and under other
specifications, the sign on the effect goes in the other direction. We do not think that anything about the nature of direct
democracy, income, and life satisfaction can be concluded from the DDB Life Satisfaction data presented by R&S.
In an effort to be fully exhaustive,we also present a series ofmodels in Table A3 that attempt to address someadditional
modeling issues in R&S. These include:
• Replacing the measure of diversity with a time-varying covariant. We use the Census State Intercensal Yearly Esti-
mates for 1985–1989 and 1991–1998 and the actual Census data for racial diversity for 1990.
• Adding a control for the liberalism of the state government. The logic here is that a citizen’s life satisfaction may be
impacted by who controls the government. Here we use the Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson (1998) measure of
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state government ideology. Updated measures are available for download here: https://rcfording.wordpress.com/
state-ideology-data
• We also include a measure of state legislative professionalism as computed by Squire (2007). States with more
professionalized legislatures tend to produce better outcomes for their citizens, so it stands to reason that this could
increase life satisfaction.
Table A3. Initiatives, income and life satisfaction, an extension.
Regression with Regression with year and 3-level multilevel model,
random effects (a) region dummies (b) individuals in state-years
in states (c)
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Initiative Density 0.027 0.015+ −0.007 0.014 0.025 0.015+
Individual Income 0.005 0.002** 0.005 0.002*** 0.004 0.002**
Initiative X Income −0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.001 −0.002 0.002
State Level Vars
State Population 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
State Income (PC) 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000+
Racial Diversity 0.127 0.091 0.122 0.111 0.119 0.095
Social Capital 0.000 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.001 0.016
State Gov’t Liberalism 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leg Professionalism −0.006 0.058 0.043 0.070 −0.003 0.060
Ind’l Level Vars
Financial Satisfaction 0.394 0.004*** 0.394 0.005*** 0.395 0.004***
Education −0.019 0.005*** −0.019 0.005*** −0.019 0.005***
Unemployed (0,1) −0.314 0.035*** −0.312 0.043*** −0.314 0.035***
Sex 0.087 0.012*** 0.087 0.013*** 0.087 0.012***
Children −0.108 0.013*** −0.109 0.015*** −0.108 0.013***
Black −0.199 0.025*** −0.197 0.031*** −0.200 0.025***
Race-Other −0.001 0.028 0.002 0.015 −0.002 0.028
Age −0.042 0.002*** −0.042 0.003*** −0.042 0.002***
Age2 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
Widowed 0.217 0.031*** 0.215 0.038*** 0.217 0.031***
Divorced 0.050 0.027+ 0.047 0.040 0.049 0.027+
Married 0.292 0.021*** 0.291 0.029*** 0.293 0.021***
Church Attendance 0.030 0.002*** 0.030 0.003*** 0.030 0.002***
Social Trust 0.106 0.005*** 0.105 0.004*** 0.106 0.005***
Health of R 0.148 0.004*** 0.148 0.005*** 0.148 0.004***
Year −0.001 0.002 — — — —
Constant 4.402 3.528 2.125 0.115*** 2.134 0.083***
Adjusted R2 = .2987 Adjusted R2 = .2988 Residual variance = 1.511
Intercept variance for state — — .0003
Intercept variance for state-years — — .0006
Log restricted-likelihood — — −77439.7
Wald Test — — 20297.2***
N (states) 48 48 48
N (state years) 672 672 672
N (individuals) 47636 47636 47636
Notes: + p < .10; ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Models (a) and (b) are regression models; model (a) includes random effects while model (b)
includes fixed effects for state and region (not shown). Model (c) is estimated using a 3-level multilevel mixed linear model: individuals
(level 1) in state-years (level 2) in states (level 3).
The addition of these variables does not change the underlying result that the interaction between ballot initiative context
and income is not statistically or substantively significant.
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